INTRODUCTION
I N January 1970 the idea of an independent Biafran the military forces of the Federal government of Nig territories, culminating in the unconditional surrender Biafran leadership. This surrender effectively bro months of military conflict which arose in the context the oil-rich Eastern Region of the country should sta state.1 Not surprisingly, the event has continued to a tention for some time now. Activists from both sides of the conflict have documented their accounts of the war.2 Independent commentators and government to back Nigeria at the cost of Biafra. Although Britain hinged its support for 'One Nigeria' on the need to prevent the bre Nigeria, and indeed African states in general, along tribal lines,8 th was more complex. Evidence in this paper suggests that British oil i played a much more important role in the determination of the Br tude to the war than is usually conceded. Specifically, Britain was i in protecting the investments of Shell-BP in Nigerian oil. In a back note prepared for the Prime Minister on the Nigerian civil war, explicitly stated that :
To refer publicly in the House to our economic stake in Nigeria would be inadvisable as it would be misunderstood or misrepresented ... Nevertheless, the facts are that Shell and BP have invested at least £250 million in Nigeria on which we now expect a large and increasing return of great importance to the British balance of payments. Other investments are worth up to £175 million. Our annual export trade is about £90 million. 16,000 British subjects live in Nigeria. All this would be at risk if we abandoned our policy of support for the Federal Government and others would be quick to take our place.9
Furthermore, although the Nigerian crude oil export to the United Kingdom, at the onset of the war, was worth only £47 million, representing 103 per cent of the volume of UK's crude oil imports, it had great potential and was increasingly becoming vital to the UK economy.10 This was because the June 1967 Middle East Six Day War, which resulted in the blockade of the Suez Canal, extensively disrupted the supply of Middle East oil to Europe. With the inaccessibility of the Suez Canal route, oil tankers from the Middle East were forced to travel a longer route by going round the Cape. This negatively impacted on both the delivery time and cost of Middle East oil supplies to Western Europe. The ban on oil sales to the United Kingdom by several Arab countries also did not help matters.11 For the British government therefore, the continued production of Nigerian oil was important in order to mitigate the precarious oil supply position in the United Kingdom at the time. Supporting Nigeria was considered its safest bet in order to achieve its objective. The protection of British oil and 8 See, for instance, the contribution of Mr. Michael Stewart, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the British parliament on 12 June 1968 (FCO/65/156).
9 PRO FCO 65/157. This advice was no doubt accepted as the British government officially downplayed their economic interest in Nigeria throughout the war. 10 ' Nigeria is important as a source of oil to the UK and to the West as a whole mainly by virtue of its geographical position i.e. it is outside the Middle East and west of the Suez Canal. For the UK, the fact that this is a large supply in the Sterling Area is also of importance. The crude is of good quality, being low in sulphur content, and reasonably cheap to produce. Furthermore, it is expected that within the next few years, Nigeria will join the "big league" of oil producing countries. Shell have told us in confidence that they expect that total production from Nigeria as a whole might by 197 1 reach 2 million barrels a day ... 60 percent of which is expected to be from the Shell-BP concessions'. See Confidential 1967 Memorandum, * Nigerian oil' (PRO/CO 221/45). economic interests was therefor Nigerian policy '.12 To achieve its aim, this article attempts to show how various Northern and Southern Nigeria i for the control of the national w chain of events that culminated analyses the role of Britain duri interests. The second part exami crisis. In the main, it shows how oil royalties, especially from S how British oil interests contributed to the decision of Britain to shift from its neutral stance to side with Nigeria. The third part examines the various political and economic interests that influenced the situation, and policies adopted by various foreign powers and how these impacted on the eventual outcome of the conflict. The fourth part concludes the paper.
ORIGINS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
The origins of the Nigerian civil war have been linked to the 1914 amalgamation of Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria by the British government.18 While it made administrative sense to manage Northern and 12 Secret Memorandum, * Nigeria: Cabinet', 10 Dec. 1968, by A. T. Gregory of the UK Petroleum Division (POWE 63/406). It has been pointed out that the evidence in this paper could also be used to contribute to the debate on the role of British businesses in the decolonization process. I have, however, chosen not to extend this research in that direction, partly because, unlike most of the literature on the role of British businesses in decolonization, the period covered by this paper is post independence. Furthermore, the direct impact of the Nigerian conflict on British domestic oil supplies may complicate any analysis in the above direction. This is because, under such circumstances, British business interests and opinions would arguably play only a secondary role. For various views and summaries on the role of British businesses in decolonization, in both specific and general contexts, see: R. Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya, IQ45-1Q63 (Princeton, 1998); J. Milburn, British Business and Ghanaian Independence (London, 1977) ; S. Stockwell, The Business of Decolonization : British Business Strategies in the Gold Coast (Oxford, 2000); P. Cain and A. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688 -1914 (London, 1993 P. Cain and A. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914 -1990 (London, 1993 ; J. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa (2nd ed., London, 1996) ; and W. Louis, 'The dissolution of the British empire', in J. Brown and W. Louis (eds.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. IV: 20th Century (Oxford, 1090) .
13 ' The problem is quite simply how to integrate the ancient emirates of the North into the rest of the country to form a unitary state. It is a simple matter of fact that nowhere in the world has it been possible to combine satisfactorily under a single central government, except in the cases of imperial domination, Mohammedan and non Mohammedan states. It would be otiose to draw up the list. An integral Mohammedan society forms a closed society ; and as such cannot be asked to accept a central government over which it has no guaranteed control. Its cultural affinity is with the rest of the Islamic world and those who do not belong to this world form a foreign element that can never be truly accepted into the society. These incontrovertible sociological factors must be respected and any attempt to ignore them can only lead to failure. The founders of the federation did not respect these factors and the story of Nigeria between Independence and the first military coup is Southern Nigeria together, it did not appear to make practical s was so because despite their proximity, their peoples, religion an were different.14 One of the main reasons for the amalgamation of and Southern Nigeria in 19 14 by the colonial government was in enable that government to reduce its subsidy of the Colony of Nigeria by using the surpluses from Southern Nigeria. When, i Southern Nigeria and Lagos became one administrative entity, the f resources of the South increased substantially. This, however, w case with Northern Nigeria. The region, with its meagre resourc from direct taxation, found it difficult to balance its budget. It th relied heavily on grants from the colonial government to function. Amalgamation thus became a means to reduce the dependence of Northern Nigeria on British taxpayers.15
Because of the vast differences between the regions, the Nigerian state that
Lugard constructed was one with strong regional governments and a weak Affairs, 70 (197O, 188. 15 See, for instance, Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation (Lagos, 1951, ' Hicks-Phillipson Report'), 68; O. Osadolor, 'The development of the federal idea and the federal framework', in K. Amuwo, A. Agbaje, R. Suberu and G. Herault (eds.), Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria (Ibadan, 1998) Region. The Action Group, wh went into opposition. In an at coalition sponsored a crisis wit nating in the declaration of a In 1963, the Western Region w 17 'The allocation of the proceeds o perplexing problem. Although the re time of the American stockpiling in mally yield a fairly constant annual s might be no difficulty in our recommending the continuation of the present system ... The problem is oil. Test production of oil has already started in the Eastern Region and exploration is being undertaken in both the North and the West. While the yield from oil royalties is at present comparatively small, ... we cannot ignore the possibility that the figure may rise very markedly within the next few years ... There is therefore a double obstacle in our recommending the simple continuation of the existing method of allocating mineral royalties. First, it would involve us, in our revenue assessment for the next few years, in crediting the Eastern Region with a source of income which is at once too uncertain to build upon, and too sizeable to ignore. Secondly, it would rob our recommendations of any confident claim to stability for the future since oil development might take place in any one of the Regions on a scale, which would quite upset the balance of national development, which it is part of our task to promote . . . Our considered conclusion therefore is that the time for change is now, while there is still uncertainty as to which of the Regions may be the lucky beneficiary or which may benefit the most*. See Colonial Office, Nigeria, Report of the Fiscal Commission (London, 1958 ['Raisman Report*]), 24. See also M. Robinson, 'Nigerian oil: prospects and perspectives', Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 6 (1964), 219. 18 'Raisman Report', 11-2. The tone of Nigeria's foreign policy was set by Abubakar's sane, moderate and essentially practical approach ... [H]e was able to resist the normal political pressures to make rude gestures to the West because his NPC Party was traditionalist and opposed to change. [Under the] . . . new Government, [t]here will be a desire to give Nigerian policies a new look. The Government will be sensitive to criticism from other African countries and disinclined to expose surface [sic] to the charge that their policies are out of harmony with majority OAU [Organization of African Unity] views. I expect therefore that Nigeria's voice will take a more strident note, and her policies will be presented as nearer to fashionable African positions . . . We can expect increasing criticism of the number of British Officers serving in influential positions and the climate may induce acceleration of retirements, with a decline in British influence. But in the early stages of the new regime, most changes are likely to be in emphasis rather than direction ... In the longer quota system in 1961 requiring 50 pet. from the North and 25 pet from each of the two southern regions. As a result, cleavages in peer groups, ranks and educational backgrounds reinforced ethnic and regional differentiations*. P. Baker, 'Why Nigeria col- Abubakar was the first Prime Minister of independent Nigeria while Senanayake was the first Prime Minister of independent Sri Lanka. See also A. Kirk-Greene, ' The peoples of Nigeria: the cultural background to the crisis', African Affairs, 66 (1967), 4. 28 PRO/DO/221/85, 6. In another memorandum, a British Foreign Office official, John Balfour asserted that : ' A sharp blow has been dealt to the power of the feudal north which under the domination of the Sardauna, was acting as a brake on social progress in that region and on inter-tribal reconciliation in the country as a whole' See 'The Nigerian situation ', 22 Feb. 1966 (PRO/FO 371/187870) . Commissioner at the time made spirited efforts to get Gowon to do more to stop the killing of Ibos.37 Gowon, however, refused 'to face up to the stark facts of the scale of brutalities in the North, and the extent of the Army's positive responsibilities for them '.38 The British government also opposed the idea of excising the oilproducing areas of Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers (COR) from the predominantly Ibo areas in order to weaken the position of Ojukwu, the then Subsequently, at the request of the Nigerian government, the British government asked its High Commissioner in Nigeria to serve in a consultative capacity to the Nigerian government during its discussions on the future political organization of the country, particularly in respect of relations between the centre and the regions and on the delineation of the regions. In a secret memo dated 30 September 1966, the Commonwealth Office gave the following instructions to the British High Commissioner :
In your discussions with the Nigerians, you should be guided by the following considerations of British Interest in the outcome of the current discussions : (a)
Nigeria is potentially one of the most powerful African states, both economically and politically. The General Approach of successive Nigerian Governments to African and World affairs has been on the side of moderation and their influence has been exerted in ways generally favourable to us and the West as whole. It is probable that a fission of Nigeria into smaller states will lay several of them open to undesirable outside influence both because of the precarious viability of some of them and because of attractions from elsewhere in Africa. A particular danger in this respect is the traditional links of the North with Cairo. We regard it as an important British interest therefore that the unity of Nigeria should be maintained in as close a form as is politically possible, (b) There are extensive British commercial interests in Nigeria, and a total British expatriate population of approximately 17,000. A comparatively recent development of importance is the oil installation in the Delta area of the Eastern Region which is being developed by British capital and management and which last year was responsible for exports from Nigeria worth £78 million. Separation of Nigeria into states of doubtful economic viability would jeopardize the substantial commercial and investment interests we have in the country.42
With the passage of time, as will be seen in the subsequent section, it became clear to the British government that the fact that the majority of Nigeria's oil was based in Eastern Nigeria had the potential to threaten the main and mind, the Federal government placed a shipping embargo on the territory. Oil tankers were initially excluded from the embargo. Biafra's new status, however, made it possible for it to demand oil royalties directly from all oil-producing companies in its region, including Shell-BP. Given the importance of oil in encouraging the secession and its potential for sustaining it, it was not surprising that one of the first Decrees published by the Biafran leadership was the Revenue Collection (No. 2) Decree of 1967. On 19 June, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance of Biafra, wrote to Shell-BP requesting the royalties. A subsequent letter estimated the royalty expected from Shell-BP for its operations for one half of 1967 at £3.510 million.62 Initially, Shell-BP was inclined towards making this payment. It believed that Ojukwu could succeed in establishing Biafra.53 Furthermore, Biafra was at the time in de facto control of its territory. The British government, however, advised caution. It reasoned that if Shell-BP paid the royalties to Biafra, then the Nigerian government would have no other option but to extend the sea blockade to include oil tankers. The Nigerian government would also be forced to attack Biafra in order to show that Biafra was not in de facto control of its territories.54 Based on the above pressure from the British government, Shell-BP changed its position and discussed the possibility of paying the royalties into a suspense account without much success.55 On 29 June 1967, Ojukwu summoned the General Manager of Shell-BP and made it explicit that the request for payment of the royalty by 1 July 1967 was 'firm and unchangeable'. The Biafran government was, however, prepared to accept a modest 'token payment' for the time being. Shell-BP subsequently informed the British government of its intention to make a token payment of £250,000 to Biafra. The British government decided not to interfere with this decision but insisted that the accompanying letter must make it unambiguous that 51 At the time, less than 10 per cent of Eastern Region oil was produced in the I bo- Shell asks them formally why a decision is being delayed, the Bank of England propose to say that this is on the technical grounds that payments between Sterling area countries should be over resident account. For your information, we have asked HM Treasury to withhold permission for political reasons. Shell knows about the decision which apparently suits them because they do not wish to set a precedent which might involve them in having to pay foreign currency to other oil producing countries' (PRO/FCO/38/in, production, would be left in production. This was possible becau erations in Nigeria were offshore. Despite this, Gowon refused to b
Because of the urgency of the matter, Britain immediately se Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. George Tho Lagos to meet General Gowon. At the meeting, held on 8 July
Secretary of State made a forceful case for the lifting of the oil blo argued that the shipping blockade was illegal under international la oil companies could not be blamed if they decided to pay royalties t This was especially so given the fact that, in international law, such could rightly be paid to the government in effective control of disp ritory. He further argued that the blockade was irrelevant to the w of the Biafran rebellion and could damage the Federal government's financial gains. The Secretary of State also made explicit the possib the relationship between the oil blockade and the rationing of supp UK could lose Nigeria goodwill in Britain.63 Gowon, however, refused to compromise on the demands to lif blockade. Instead he promised to review his decision on the blockad intervals and to look into the legal issues with respect to the pa royalties. Given the failure of the 8 July meeting, the British govern surprisingly refused to commit itself with respect to the earlier r Nigeria for military assistance. Although the government had earli internally to offer limited arms and military support to the Feder ment, this was subject to Gowon's cooperation on the issue of the o ade.64
Gowon' s promise on the royalty issue culminated in the setting up of an intergovernmental review committee. The result was an instant deadlock, as neither side could agree on the position of international law. This was perhaps not surprising, especially given the fact that even the British knew that their position was not unassailable. Internally, they conceded that they had 'no locus standi to complain on behalf of the company', which was Nigerian-registered, and that the blockade was ' simply a measure legitimately taken to suppress the rebellion and restore law and order'.65 The Nigerian government subsequently made it explicit to Shell-BP that it expected the company to pay the outstanding oil royalty immediately.66 Once the oil flow stopped, sitting on the fence ceased to be an option for the British government calculated that suppor to preserve its oil interests in the the rivalry among some Western E foreign powers would wade into th ment may have believed that Biafr not in a position to guarantee its s was further complicated by the position of the OAU and of most British academics, which strongly favoured adherence to the existing colonial boundaries.69 Concomitantly, Shell-BP was advised to retrace its steps and attempt reconciliation with Lagos. The British High Commissioner explained the reasoning :
How are Shell-BP to resolve the consequent permutations ? If the side they have offended loses all is well. If it wins, they are, I think, a little worse off if the side they have offended is the Federal government. Ojukwu, even victorious, will not be in a strong position. He will require all the international help and recognition he can get. The Federal Government would be much better placed both internationally and internally. They would have a cast iron case for the severest treatment of a company which had subsidized a rebel, and I feel fairly convinced they would press their case to the lengths of cancelling the Company's concessions and nationalizing their installations. I conclude, therefore, if the Company does change its mind and asks the British Government for advice, the best that could be given is for it to clamber hastily back on the Lagos side of the fence with cheque book at the ready.70 With the stalling of the token payment of £250,000, it soon became clear to the Biafran government that Shell-BP and the British government had no intention of paying into its coffers the disputed oil royalty. Without any positive response from the company, the Biafran government subsequently asked Shell-BP to cease operations in Biafra and took over, for * protection', the company's installations and other properties in its territory. suggests that it may be premature to assume that Shell BPs £2oom has been nationalized or will not be returned when the civil war ends' (PRO/FCO/38/1 12, fo. 214).
Despite the above announcement, Shell-BP refused to alter its pos Officially, they argued that, given the unusual circumstances of the tim company had no alternative but to adhere strictly to the legal terms of contract, which could be interpreted to mean that royalty payment fo was not strictly due until February 1968. Privately, however, they assu Gowon that the royalty would be paid to the Nigerian government that the argument was necessary to protect the interest of Shell-BP legally.72 At this stage the position of the British government and Shell-BP on the Nigerian conflict had been unified. For the British oil interests to be served, there was a need to bring the conflict to a swift end. There were, however, other interests that had the potential to extend the conflict. The war indeed soon became a focus for rivalries among some European powers.78
FOREIGN INTERESTS AND THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
As mentioned, Shell-BP was not the only company producing oil in Nigeria before the civil war. Gulf Oil Nigeria was also active in the oil market, producing roughly 9 per cent of Nigerian oil at the time. The American company operations were, however, offshore from the MidWestern Region, which was part of Nigerian territory. Given the fact that America had no colonial knowledge of the region, there was no basis for upsetting its economic interests there. The company therefore promptly paid their royalties and rents to the Federal government. The consequence was that the American government did not give serious thought to the Biafran secession. It simply considered it as the internal affair of Nigeria and a British responsibility.74 Another European power interested in the Nigerian conflict was the Soviet Union which had no investments in Nigerian oil. It simply saw the conflict as an avenue for increasing its influence in Africa, especially in the context of the Cold War.75 Increased Soviet influence in Nigeria no doubt threatened British economic interests in the 72 Cable from Shell BP Lagos to SIPC London, 1 Aug. 1968 (PRO/FCO/38/112). 78 According to an undated confidential Foreign and Colonial Office memorandum, 'Nigeria: a background note on British interests and the government's approach to the civil war ' : * We have no ambitions other than the preservation of our traditional interests in Nigeria . . . But the Russians are using the increasing Nigerian dependence on them for arms supplies to effect a growing penetration of Nigeria. A Russian foothold in this, in many respects the most important of West African states, would be contrary to the interests of ourselves and our friends. This consideration has not so far weighed greatly with the French, who despite their denials are believed to be assisting the supply of arms to Biafra. Their objective appears to be the breakup of Nigeria, which threatens by its size and potential to over shadow France's client francophone states in West Africa* (PRO/ FCO/65/179).
74 N. Brown, 'Arms supply ', Venture, 21 (1969), 8; and J. Elaigwu, ' The Nigerian civil war and the Angolan civil war', Journal of Asian and African Studies, 12 (1977), 218. 75 For a detailed analysis of the reasons behind Soviet support for Nigeria, see G. Obiozor, 'Soviet involvement in the Nigerian civil conflict', in U. Damachi and H. Seibel (eds.) , Social Change and Economic Development in Nigeria (New York, 1973); and O. Ogunbadejo, 'Nigerian-Soviet relations', African Affairs, 87 (1988), 83-104. country. It was, for instance, argu from Nigeria:
The Federal Government would have no alternative but to turn to the Soviet Union for ever-widening support. The Russians would use their new influence the full ... Finally, there is the risk that Russian advice and propaganda migh encourage the Nigerians to take over the oil industry, the Russians being we placed to provide the technical expertise, which the Nigerians lack.76
Unlike the Soviet Union, the French government had both political and economic interest in the Nigerian civil conflict. Under colonial rule, the Wes African sub-region was partitioned mainly between Britain and France.
During colonial rule, France broke up the old Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF). This was because it believed that local nationalisms would not allow a federal structure to survive for long in independent Africa.77 Given the relatively small size of Francophone West African countries, the existence of a large Nigerian Federation in the region became a definite threat Apart from these political considerations, the French also had economic concerns. France's major interest was in Eastern Region oil. This was, at the time, being developed through Societe Anonyme Francaise de Recherches et d' Exploitation Petrolieres (SAFRAP) Nigeria Limited. At the time the war broke out, the company controlled only 7 per cent of oil production in Port Harcourt. Also important was the fact that, unlike the o companies operating in Nigeria, most of its oil reserves lay inside created East Central State, which was the core Ibo region.82 It wa not surprising that, from the onset of the crisis, SAFRAP supported the Biafran side. Apart from the peculiar characteristics of its oil locations, there was also a chance that, in the event of a successful secession, it could inherit the assets of Shell-BP, which was considered by Biafra as backing the Nigerian cause.83 Again unsurprisingly, the company agreed to pay the £100,000 demanded by the Biafrans as royalty in June 1967.84 Despite this, SAFRAP had to close down its operations because of the shipping embargo, which made it difficult for it to ship its oil.
Although France supported the Biafran cause, it consistently denied being a major provider of arms in the conflict. This not only tightens the grip on the blockade and gives the Federal Government a first footing in the Rivers Province ; it places in their hands the most valuable part of Shell-BP installations, for the storage tanks, the pumping station and the tanker terminal are all at Bonny.94
At the time of the capture, the Nigerian government claimed that the Island was taken ' without any damage* to Shell-BP's installations there.95 On 9 October 1967, Mr. Gray of Shell-BP returned to Lagos to 'test the atmosphere'. At the time, there was concern that the initial sympathy of Shell-BP for the Biafran side and the disastrous meeting of Mr. Thomas, the British Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, with Gowon, on the oil tanker ban, may have irked the Nigerian side. This view was perhaps fuelled by negative reports in the Nigerian press about both the UK government and Shell-BP. Some went to the extent of suggesting that the government should nationalize Shell-BP. Fortunately for the company, the Nigerian government was so preoccupied with the war that it did not have the time to think out an oil policy less favourable to the interests of Shell-BP and the British government. Furthermore, once the war broke out and the British government decided to back the Nigerian side, the BBC swiftly shifted its reporting on the conflict, in Nigeria's favour. This was noticed and thankfully acknowledged by the Nigerian government.96 When Gray returned to Lagos, he was well received and his hesitation quickly melted The oil disruption in Port Harcourt also hindered Shell-BP product in Mid-Western Nigeria, which was under the control of the F government, where it was producing 122,000 barrels of crude oil da the civil war in 1967, equal to 26 per cent of Nigeria's total oil (see Table i ).103 The problem was that the oil had to be shippe Bonny, which at the time was not safe. Furthermore, silting of t aches to the Bonny terminal during the early parts of the war re unit tanker capacity from 70,000 tons to about 40,000 tons. Even w of smaller tankers, the short haul from Nigeria to Britain was profitable than the Cape route used for Gulf oil.104 Despite th for Eastern Region oil, the civil war made the source unreliab for Shell-BP, prior to the war, it had planned a second terminal off which was in Federal territory. Construction of the termina pipelines, which started during the war, took 18 months and was in the middle of 1969. This new terminal had the capacity to acco 200,000-ton tankers and to handle all the Mid-Western Re production, which was expected to exceed 18 million tons.105 Cons Nigerian oil production, which fell to 142,000 barrels per day in 19 540,000 barrels per day in 1969. 106 The implication was that while Nigeria generated immense reven oil, which helped it finance its war efforts, the same could no Biafra.107 Oil exports for Biafra throughout the war were almost ent.108 This, coupled with an effective air and sea embargo, increas and Soviet Union military supplies to Nigeria, and waning French finally led to its surrender in January 1970. This, no doubt, was to of both Shell-BP and the British government. aviation fuel to Sao Tome. Once the war started, however, Sao Tome beca transit centre for Biafran arms and relief. The result was that Shell-BP was planes that carried arms and relief into Biafra. Shell-BP was willing to contin profitable arrangement, which was described by the British establishmen
